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An algorithm is presented which implements a probabilistic attack on the key-exchange protocol
based on permutation parity machines. Instead of imitating the synchronization of the communicat-
ing partners, the strategy consists of a Monte Carlo method to sample the space of possible weights
during inner rounds and an analytic approach to convey the extracted information from one outer
round to the next one. The results show that the protocol under attack fails to synchronize faster
than an eavesdropper using this algorithm.
PACS numbers: 84.35.+i, 87.18.Sn, 89.70.-a, 05.10.Ln
Interacting feed-forward neural networks can synchro-
nize by mutual learning [1, 2]. If two networks A and
B are trained with examples consisting of random in-
puts and the corresponding output of the other one, their
weight vectors converge. In the case of tree parity ma-
chines (TPMs) this mutual synchronization of A and B
requires fewer examples than training a third network E
successfully [3–7]. Based on this effect a TPM-based neu-
ral key-exchange protocol has been developed [8–11] and
shown to be useful in embedded devices [12, 13] as well
as being sufficiently secure against several attacks [7].
Recently, a variant of neural cryptography has been
presented in Ref. [14] which uses permutation parity
machines (PPMs) [15] instead of TPMs. This change
increases the robustness of the key-exchange protocol
against the attacks which have been tried on the TPM-
based algorithm before [16–18]. However, it also reduces
the number of possible values per weight from 2L+1 ≥ 3
to 2, so that other attacks become more feasible. This is
especially true for the probabilistic attack, which has been
suggested by Ref. [19], but not implemented up to now.
We have used this idea and developed an attack method
especially suited for PPM-based neural cryptography. In
this Rapid Communication, we describe our attack and
present results indicating its success.
A PPM is a neural network consisting of two layers:
There are K hidden units in the first layer, each of which
has an independent receptive field of size N , and only
one neuron in the second layer. Its KN inputs xi,j
with indices i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . ,K are binary:
xi,j ∈ {0, 1}. In order to simplify the notation they are
combined into input vectors xj = (x1,j , . . . , xN,j)
⊤ or the
input matrix X = (x1, . . . ,xK) where appropriate.
The weights wi,j are selected elements from the state
vector s of the PPM, which consists ofG≫ KN elements
si ∈ {0, 1}. For that purpose a matrix pi of size N ×K
containing numbers pii,j ∈ {1, . . . , G} is used, so that
wi,j = spii,j . The weight vector wj = (w1,j , . . . , wN,j)
⊤
then determines the mapping from the input vector xj
to the state σj ∈ {0, 1} of the j-th hidden unit. First,
the vector local field hj is calculated as the one-by-one
logical xor operation
hj = xj ⊕wj =⇒ hi,j = xi,j ⊕ wi,j (1)
of the bits in xj and wj . Then the unit becomes active,
σj = 1, if the majority of elements in hj is equal to 1,
otherwise it stays inactive, σj = 0:
σj = Θ
(
hj −
N
2
)
, (2)
where
hj =
N∑
i=1
hi,j (3)
denotes the scalar local field and
Θ(x) =
{
0 for x ≤ 0,
1 for x > 0,
(4)
is the Heaviside step function. Finally, the total output
of the PPM is calculated as the binary state τ ∈ {0, 1}
of the single unit in the second layer which is set to the
parity
τ =
K⊕
j=1
σj (5)
of the hidden states σj .
When implementing the synchronization task, two
PPMs (A and B) designed with the same settings (i.e.,
with same N , K, and G) are provided. The synchroniza-
tion will succeed after several inner and outer rounds,
which are described below.
For each inner round, the elements of the matrix pi
and the input vectors xj are drawn randomly and in-
dependently from their corresponding value set. These
quantities are provided publicly to all PPMs, which in-
cludes even an attacker E. Then both A and B compute
their outputs τA and τB and if they agree (τA = τB),
they store the state σA1 and σ
B
1 of their first hidden units
in a buffer, which remains private for each PPM.
2Thus, there are as follows: public and common input
vectors xj and the pi matrix; public, but not necessar-
ily equal outcomes τA and τB; private, not necessarily
equal state vectors sA and sB; and private, not necessar-
ily equal states of the hidden units σAj and σ
B
j .
The inner rounds are repeated until the buffers where
σA1 and σ
B
1 are stored reach size G. Then, an outer round
is completed and each buffer becomes the new state vec-
tor in the corresponding machine, substituting the old
one. The dynamics of the PPMs are such that after each
outer round the state vectors sA, sB tend to be more
alike, eventually reaching full synchronization sA = sB.
The synchronization time ts measured in the number of
outer rounds is a random variable, as it depends on ran-
domly chosen initial conditions and inputs. However, its
mean value rises in a polynomial fashion with increasing
size N of the input vector as well as growing size G of
the state vector s [15].
Reported previous attacks on PPMs tried to mimic
the behavior of the synchronizing networks by using a
single machine or an ensemble [14]. They showed poor
performance in guessing sA correctly. Namely, for the
attacks on PPMs with K = 2 and G = 128 analyzed in
Ref. [14], the probability of success did not exceed 10−5.
In the following, we present the description of a dif-
ferent attack strategy. It does not pursue to mimic the
synchronizing process, but to first guess the state vector
of A (or B) during an outer round and consecutively to
reproduce A’s (or B’s) behavior during the given round
so that a fair guessing of the bits stored in the buffer and
the subsequent sA for the next outer round can be done.
Some notation is introduced. The synchronizing par-
ties A and B are eavesdropped by a third agent E, which
implements its own PPM with state vector sE and out-
put τE. Additionally, the attacker uses a probabilistic
state vector pE = (p1, . . . , pG)
⊤ to describe its knowl-
edge about A’s state vector sA. Each element pi is an
approximation of the marginal probability P (sAi = 0|D)
that the i-th bit of sA is 0 given all data D observed by
E before, i.e., inputs and outputs of A and B, which have
already been transmitted over the public channel.
At the beginning of the probabilistic attack previous
information about sA is not available. Therefore, E starts
with a neutral hypothesis and all pi are initialized with
the prior probability P (si = 0) = 1/2.
In each inner round an input X and a matrix pi
are provided to all PPMs. Then A and B calculate
their outputs and communicate them publicly. This en-
ables E to update pE based on the observed data X ,
pi, and τA. For that purpose the posterior probability
P (si = 0|p
E, X, pi, τA) is estimated using a Monte Carlo
approach, which is similar to approximate Bayesian com-
putation [20].
This works by generatingM state vectors sE which are
compatible with the current observation as well as prior
knowledge obtained in previous rounds. The G elements
of a candidate sE are sampled independently from the
Bernoulli distribution with probabilities P (si = 0) = pi
and P (si = 1) = 1 − pi. Of course, it is only necessary
to draw bits si which are selected as weights by pi. All
others can be omitted without affecting the result. This
shortcut speeds the sampling up considerably if G ≫
KN . Then sE is plugged into E’s PPM together with X
and pi in order to calculate τE. If E’s output matches A’s,
τE = τA, the candidate is stored; if not, it is dismissed.
This procedure goes on until M valid state vectors sE
have been produced.
Afterward, the desired marginal posterior probability
P (si = 0|p
E, X, pi, τA) can be estimated as the relative
frequency of si = 0 in the sample. The result is then
used to update all pi which have been selected as weights
in the current round. The other elements of pE remain
unchanged, because the attacker gained no information
about the corresponding parts of sA. Of course, this
computation is repeated for the next inner round.
As the space of all weight matricesW = (w1, . . . ,wK)
is of size 2NK , approximately 2NK−1 of them are com-
patible with a given X , pi, and τA. Thus if the sampling
algorithm generates M ≥ 2NK−1 state vectors, it would
be similar to a brute force attack. But choosing such a
large parameter M is only feasible for a very small num-
ber of weights.
Updating pE as described above has the effect that its
elements pi converge toward 0 or 1 after several rounds,
so that finally M equal state vectors with
pi = 0 =⇒ si = 1, (6)
pi = 1 =⇒ si = 0, (7)
are sampled. However, defining
sE∗i =
{
0 for pi > 1/2,
1 for pi ≤ 1/2,
(8)
as the most probable state provided pE, the attack is
considered a success as soon as sE∗ = sA without regard
to whether or not all the pi have collapsed to 0 or 1.
In contrast, if one or more pi have collapsed to the
wrong value, E might be unable to achieve the desired
output τE = τA in a later round. Such a failure clearly
indicates that the estimation of some pi has gone wrong.
In order to avoid an infinite loop in this case, only a finite
number of attempts is made to generateM valid samples
sE. If the limit is reached, the element pi of p
E which
is closest to collapse is reset to the neutral hypothesis,
pi = 1/2.
Usually, the algorithm will not be able to guess sA cor-
rectly in less than one outer round, therefore we need a
mechanism to transfer the information gained during an
outer round into the next one. Let pE− be the proba-
bilistic state vector after applying the previous algorithm
on all the inner rounds of a whole outer round. In or-
der to transfer the information the attacker calculates
the probability distribution for the state σE1 of the first
hidden unit conditioned on the probabilistic state vector
pE− as well as the input X and the matrix pi for each
of the inner rounds with τA = τB. The result is then
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Synchronization time ts and break time
tb measured in outer rounds as a function of N for PPMs with
K = 2, G = 128. Symbols denote mean values and error bars
denote standard deviations obtained in 100 runs (even N).
Lines show the results of a fit using linear regression as given
in Table I. For odd N around 25 out of 100 runs reaching
t = 30 had to be aborted and discarded from the data set.
used to construct the probabilistic state vector pE+ for
the start of the next outer round.
In the following we describe an algorithm to approxi-
mate the probability that a single hidden unit has inter-
nal state σj = 0 given p
E and the corresponding public
information of an inner round. The output σj depends
only on the number of 1s in the vector local field hj ,
which is equal to the scalar local field hj . Here we approx-
imate the probability distribution P (hj = n|p
E−, X, pi)
of this quantity by a binomial distribution which uses the
average probability of finding a 1 in hj as a parameter
qj =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
xi,j ppii,j + (1− xi,j)(1− ppii,j )
]
. (9)
Then, the probability
P (σj = 0|p
E−, X, pi) =
N/2∑
n=0
P (hj = n|p
E−, X, pi)(10)
of σj = 0 is given by
P (σj = 0|p
E−, X, pi) =
N/2∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
qnj (1 − qj)
N−n. (11)
Finally, the attacker stores this result in pE+ when-
ever τA = τB occurred in the inner round. This pro-
cedure succeeded in conveying enough information from
one outer round to the next one.
An alternative approach to this task seems to be Monte
Carlo sampling of σE1 conditioned on the final p
E−. But
in our simulations this method proved to be prone to
failure: Either pE was effectively reset or the algorithm
could not generate enough valid weight candidates at
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Success probability Ps of the attack
as a function of N for PPMs with K = 2. Symbols denote
the percentage of successful attacks found in 100 simulations
(even N). For odd N around 25 out of 100 runs had to be
stopped after 30 outer rounds without a clear result, i.e., ts >
30 and tb > 30. These simulations were not considered for
calculating the probability of success Ps.
N Time Slope a Offset b
Even ts 0.495 ± 0.028 2.01 ± 0.28
Even tb 0.1275± 0.0038 2.180± 0.038
Odd ts 0.245 ± 0.076 9.02 ± 0.95
Odd tb 0.157 ± 0.028 4.33 ± 0.35
TABLE I. Linear regression with model t = aN+b for average
synchronization time ts and break time tb.
some inner round. Thus we developed and used the an-
alytic approach instead of calculating pE+ by sampling.
The attack described in this Rapid Communication is
often capable of guessing the state vector sA in a number
of outer rounds that are less than the number of rounds
that A and B needed to synchronize. This result was
reproduced for many different setups of the synchronizing
PPMs: varying input vector size and varying state vector
size. The usual setup for cryptographic is to use even N ,
since PPMs with odd N synchronize notably slower or
sometimes not at all [15]. However, the algorithm was
also tried for odd N with an illustrative purpose and
yielded satisfactory results.
As for the technicalities a sampling size of M = 103
was chosen. This implies that for N = 2, 4 the algorithm
works similar to a brute force attack, but for large N
only a small part of the weight space is sampled, e.g.,
for N = 8 only around 3% of all possible weight configu-
rations. The absent of performance drop notwithstand-
ing the scarce sampling highlights the efficiency of the
algorithm. The mechanism to prevent the attack from
getting stuck was implemented by resetting one of the
bits each time that M2 = 106 consecutive unsuccess-
ful attempts at generating a valid weight candidate were
reached. Finally, the attack was considered a success
4as soon as sE∗ = sA has been reached. The number of
outer rounds needed to achieve this is called break time
tb, which varies randomly depending on the initial con-
ditions and the course of the key exchange.
Figure 1 shows that the mean values of synchroniza-
tion time 〈ts〉 as well as break time 〈tb〉 grow linearly
with increasing size N of the input vectors. For all cases
presented here we find that the attacker is faster than the
two partners on average, 〈tb〉 < 〈ts〉. Additionally, lin-
ear regression results shown in Table I indicate that 〈tb〉
grows slower than 〈ts〉, so that increasing N does not
improve the security of the PPM-based key exchange.
Synchronization with odd N is much slower than for
even N . Only runs with tb < 30 or ts < 30 were consid-
ered here to reduce computational costs. This condition
also excludes failed synchronization attempts caused by
reaching a stable antiparallel weight configuration [15],
which can only happen if N is odd.
In Fig. 2 the performance of the algorithm is presented
in terms of the probability of success of the attack. The
functionality for many more different setups is exam-
ined here. Regarding cases with even N , the perfor-
mance of the algorithm generally increases as N or G
become larger. For nearly all configurations shown here
the success probability Ps is above 80% and it actually
reaches 100% in many situations. Odd N is consider-
ably more difficult for the attacker, but nevertheless the
success probability Ps remains larger than 50%. These
values, however, have been obtained for single runs of
our algorithm on each data set. As the method is non-
deterministic due to Monte Carlo sampling in each inner
round, repeating it on the same observations should lead
to even more success.
Consequently, the results clearly show that the PPM-
based neural key-exchange protocol using the parameter
values K, N , and G analyzed in this Rapid Communica-
tion is not secure enough for any cryptographic applica-
tion. Furthermore, there is no indication that increasing
the sizes of input or state vectors would reduce the suc-
cess probability and lead to a secure configuration.
In contrast, the complexity of successful attacks on
TPM-based neural cryptography increases exponentially
with the number 2L+1 of possible weight values, but the
effort of the partners grows only proportional to L2 [7].
Here L has the same effect as the key size in encryption
algorithms, which allows to balance speed and security.
While the probabilistic attack [19] has not been tested on
TPM-based neural cryptography, it is quite likely that
the same scaling law for L applies to its success prob-
ability. But in order to answer this open question we
are going to implement and analyze such probabilistic
attacks also for TPMs.
The same question could be asked regarding the se-
curity of chaos cryptography [21–23], which is based on
a similar synchronization principle [24]. Consequently,
probabilistic attacks should be envisioned and tested
there, too. Nevertheless, the specificity of the present
implementation suggests that further development is
needed for attacks on chaotic cryptography.
L.F.S. acknowledges the financial support of Fun-
dacio´n Pedro Barrie´ de la Maza and funding Grant
No. 01GQ1001B.
[1] R. Metzler, W. Kinzel, and I. Kanter, Phys. Rev. E 62,
2555 (2000), arXiv:cond-mat/0003051.
[2] W. Kinzel, R. Metzler, and I. Kanter, J. Phys. A: Math.
Gen. 33, L141 (2000), arXiv:cond-mat/9906058.
[3] M. Rosen-Zvi, I. Kanter, and W. Kinzel, J. Phys. A:
Math. Gen. 35, L707 (2002), arXiv:cond-mat/0202350.
[4] M. Rosen-Zvi, E. Klein, I. Kanter, and W. Kinzel, Phys.
Rev. E 66, 066135 (2002), arXiv:cond-mat/0209234.
[5] W. Kinzel and I. Kanter, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 36,
11173 (2003).
[6] I. Kanter and W. Kinzel, Quantum Comput. Comput. 5,
130 (2005).
[7] A. Ruttor, W. Kinzel, and I. Kanter, Phys. Rev. E 75,
056104 (2007), arXiv:cond-mat/0612537.
[8] I. Kanter, W. Kinzel, and E. Kanter, Europhys. Lett.
57, 141 (2002), arXiv:cond-mat/0202112.
[9] R. Mislovaty, E. Klein, I. Kanter, and W. Kinzel, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 91, 118701 (2003), arXiv:cond-mat/0302097.
[10] A. Ruttor, W. Kinzel, L. Shacham, and I. Kanter, Phys.
Rev. E 69, 046110 (2004), arXiv:cond-mat/0311607.
[11] A. Ruttor, W. Kinzel, and I. Kanter, J. Stat. Mech. ,
P01009 (2005), arXiv:cond-mat/0411374.
[12] M. Volkmer and S. Wallner, IEEE Transactions on Com-
puters 54, 421 (2005), arXiv:cs/0502062.
[13] S. Mu¨hlbach and S. Wallner, J. Syst. Archit. 54, 1065
(2008).
[14] O. M. Reyes and K.-H. Zimmermann, Phys. Rev. E 81,
066117 (2010).
[15] O. M. Reyes, I. Kopitzke, and K.-H. Zimmermann, J.
Phys. A: Math. Gen. 42, 195002 (2009).
[16] R. Mislovaty, Y. Perchenok, I. Kanter, and
W. Kinzel, Phys. Rev. E 66, 066102 (2002),
arXiv:cond-mat/0206213.
[17] L. N. Shacham, E. Klein, R. Mislovaty, I. Kanter,
and W. Kinzel, Phys. Rev. E 69, 066137 (2004),
arXiv:cond-mat/0312068.
[18] A. Ruttor, W. Kinzel, R. Naeh, and I. Kanter, Phys.
Rev. E 73, 036121 (2006), arXiv:cond-mat/0512022.
[19] A. Klimov, A. Mityaguine, and A. Shamir, in Advances
in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2002, edited by Y. Zheng
(Springer, Heidelberg, 2003) p. 288.
[20] T. Toni, D. Welch, N. Strelkowa, A. Ipsen, and M. P. H.
Stumpf, J. R. Soc. Interface 6, 187 (2009).
[21] K. M. Cuomo and A. V. Oppenheim, Phys. Rev. Lett.
71, 65 (1993).
[22] G. Grassi and S. Mascolo, IEEE Trans. Circ. Sys. I 49,
1135 (1999).
[23] E. Klein, N. Gross, E. Kopelowitz, M. Rosenbluh,
L. Khaykovich, W. Kinzel, and I. Kanter, Phys. Rev.
E 74, 046201 (2006), arXiv:cond-mat/0604569.
[24] L. M. Pecora and T. L. Carroll, Phys. Rev. Lett. 64, 821
(1990).
